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Abstract-In 1988 the Dutch government launched a proposal for a national health insurance based on 
regulated competition. The mandatory benefits package should be offered by competing insurers and 
should cover both non-catastrophic risks (like hospital care, physician services and drugs) and catastrophic 
risks (like several forms of expensive long-term care). However, there are two arguments to exclude some 
of the catastrophic risks from the competitive insurance market, at least during the implementation process 
of the reforms. Firstly, the prospects for a workable system of risk-adjusted payments to the insurers that 
should take away the incentives for cream skimming are, at least during the next 5 years, more favorable 
for the non-catastrophic risks than for the catastrophic risks. Secondly, even if a workable system of 
risk-adjusted payments can be developed, the problem of quality skimping may be relevant for some of 
the catastrophic risks, but not for non-catastrophic risks. By ‘quality skimping’ we mean the reduction 
of the quality of care to a level which is below the minimum level that is acceptable to society. 
After 5 years of health care reforms in the Netherlands new insights have resulted in a growing support 
to confine the implementation of the reforms to the non-catastrophic risks. In drawing (and redrawing) 
the exact boundaries between different regulatory regimes for catastrophic and non-catastrophic risks, the 
expected benefits of a cost-effective substitution of care have to be weighted against the potential harm 
caused by cream skimming and quality skimping. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1988 the Dutch government and parliament de- 
cided to radically reform the health care system. The 
reforms are inspired by Enthoven’s Consumer- 
Choice Health Plan (11 and are based on the rec- 
ommendations of the Dekker-committee. The 
proposed system can be described as a national health 
insurance based on regulated competition. The re- 
forms can be characterized as a transition from 
government regulated cartels to government regu- 
lated competition among insurers and among 
providers of care. Competing insurers are supposed 
to selectively contract with competing providers of 
care. Insurers therefore function as third-party pur- 
chasers of care. A major difference with Enthoven’s 
Consumer-Choice Health Plan is the extent of the 
benefits package. In Enthoven’s proposal qualified 
health plans would be required to cover, at a mini- 
mum, the list of services called ‘basic health services’ 
in the HMO Act of 1973 (as amended). That list 
includes physician services, inpatient and outpatient 
hospital services, emergency health services, short- 
term outpatient mental health services (up to 20 
visits), treatment and referral for drug and alcohol 
abuse, laboratory and X-ray, home health services 
and certain preventive health services. We will refer 
to these basic health services as ‘non-catastrophic 
risks’. The Dutch government proposed that compet- 
ing insurers should offer a benefits package covering 
these non-catastrophic risks as well as catastrophic 
risks like several forms of expensive long-term care 
(nursing home care, care for mentally and physically 
handicapped persons, and institutional psychiatric 
care). Since 1989 a step-by-step implementation of 
the reforms is taking place. Since then a number of 
major changes has taken place and new problems 
have emerged. 
In this paper we will first shortly describe the main 
lines of the reforms and then sketch the progress 
made so far: what has (not) been realized and what 
new problems came up? (section 2). Then we will 
discuss two arguments why we think that some forms 
of catastrophic risks should be excluded from the 
competitive insurance market, at least during the 
implementation period of the reforms. These argu- 
ments are related to two major issues in a competitive 
market for health insurance (or: third-party purchas- 
ing of health care) with a regulated premium struc- 
ture: skimming and skimping (section 3). Cream 
skimming or preferred risk selection is the selection 
by the insurer or third-party purchaser of care of 
those insureds for whom the expected costs are lower 
than the revenues. By ‘quality skimping’ we mean the 
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reduction of the quality of care to a level which is 
below the minimum level that is acceptable to society. 
Finally we will summarize the conclusions and dis- 
cuss the perspectives for the Dutch health care re- 
forms (section 4). 
2. HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
2.1. Why such radical reforms? 
The health care system in the Netherlands is a 
complex mixture of elaborate government regulation 
and private enterprise. Despite the predominance of 
private ownership, the current Dutch health care 
system is heavily regulated by government. During 
the period 1960-1980 the health expenditures in the 
Netherlands as a percentage of gross domestic 
product doubled from 3.9 to 8.0%. In order to 
control this rise in expenditures, a lot of government 
regulation has been introduced, especially from the 
mid 1970s. During the 1980s the health expenditures 
as percentage of gross domestic product remained 
rather stable, which is mainly the result of the 
government imposed restraints on hospital capacity 
(introduced in the 197Os), the global budgeting of 
hospitals (introduced in 1983), government regu- 
lation of the salaries of nurses, manpower planning 
and other detailed government regulation of volume, 
price and productive capacity in health care. So one 
may wonder: what is the need for the Dutch govem- 
ment to come up with a proposal for such radical 
reforms? 
In a clear answer to this question the Dutch 
government i..:ntioned the following four reasons for 
reforming the health care system [2]. Firstly, the 
uncoordinatedfinancing structure for health care and 
social welfare (homes for the aged, family assistance 
programs and social work) impedes cost-effective 
substitution of care. Closely interrelated forms of 
health care delivery are frequently artificially separ- 
ated by multiple financing mechanisms and complex 
regulations. Secondly, the Dutch health care system 
is characterized by a lack of incentives for efficiency. 
There are hardly any financial incentives for efficiency 
for parties involved, i.e. producers of care, consumers 
and insurers. The financing system is such that in 
many cases economic and efficient behavior is finan- 
cially punished, while noneconomic and inefficient 
behavior is financially rewarded. Therefore, changing 
the present financing system is a necessary condition 
for improving efficiency in health care. Thirdly, the 
detailed government regulation turned OUI to have 
negative effects. According to government many 
problems in the health care system are a consequence 
of the complex legislation and detailed regulation: 
-The very detailed regulation of capacity plan- 
ning in health care has turned out to be 
unworkable. This failure is due to the com- 
plexity of the planning process, the many 
parties involved, their conflicting interests, 
and the lack of clarity of the regulation (many 
rapid changes and inconsistencies with other 
forms of regulation). As a matter of fact. 
rather blunt measures, such as a national 
budget for investments in hospital construc- 
tion, proved to be far more effective than the 
sophisticated planning of health care facilities. 
-A major problem appears to be the relation- 
ship between planning and financing. A cru- 
cial question is whether planning should 
precede financing or whether planning should 
follow financing decisions. In the present sys- 
tem, planning and financing decisions are 
made separately. Hence, none of the involved 
parties is fully responsible for the conse- 
quences of these decisions. 
-The centrally regulated remuneration system 
of providers impedes flexibility and efficient 
allocation. Since the beginning of the 1980s 
the remuneration system is the source of recur- 
rent conflicts between government and health 
care providers. 
Fourthly, there are several problems with the pre- 
sent Dutch health insurance system. All employees 
(and their families) earning an annual wage below 
56,000 guilders (which equals about U.S.$ 30,000 at 
1994 exchange rate) are compulsorily insured by one 
of the 20 sickness funds. This also holds true after 
retirement. Except for a limited group of civil ser- 
vants who have their own mandatory scheme, the 
remainder (about 34%) of the population, consisting 
mainly of self-employed and higher income groups, 
can voluntarily buy private health insurance. They 
can choose among one of the 40 competing private 
health insurers operating in the Netherlands. Finally, 
there is a compulsory national health insurance 
scheme (AWBZ) providing coverage for the whole 
population against catastrophic risks, such as hospi- 
tal care exceeding one year, long-term nursing home 
care and long-term institutional care for mentally and 
physically handicapped persons. Without going into 
details, the many problems in the Dutch health 
insurance system are related to the existence of 
different insurance schemes with different premium 
structures, and the effects of an unregulated competi- 
tive market for private health insurance [2]. 
The above four arguments for reform were given in 
1988 by the then center-right coalition cabinet. Two 
years later the new cabinet, a center-left coalition, 
endorsed the above arguments, particularly stressing 
the failure of the detailed government regulation of 
volume, prices and productive capacity. According to 
the government the major cause of this failure was 
that in fact only government was responsible for cost 
containment. All other parties-providers, insurers 
and patients-could oppose government regulation 
without committing themselves in any way. Govern- 
ment seriously doubted that in a system in which 
government is the only braking factor, in the long run 
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cost could be contained without jeopardizing the 
quality of care. Therefore, from the government’s 
point of view, a major purpose of the proposed 
reform is to share the responsibility for cost contain- 
ment in health care with the other parties, that is the 
providers, the insurers and the population. 
2.2. Reform proposal 
In March 1988 the Dutch government presented a 
proposal for a market-oriented reform of the health 
care sector [2]. This reform-proposal, that was based 
on the recommendations of the Dekker-committee 
(March 1987), was accepted by Parliament in the 
autumn of 1988. In 1990 the main lines of the reform 
proposal were also accepted by the new government 
[4]. Since then the reforms are referred to as ‘Plan-Si- 
mons’, named after the State Secretary for health, Mr 
Hans Simons. Although the main lines of the 1988- 
government reform proposal are the same as the 
1990-proposal, the vocabulary is different, reflecting 
the social democratic background of the State Sec- 
retary. Key-words in the 1988-proposal of the then 
center-right coalition cabinet are competition, market 
and incentives. In the 1990-proposal of the center-left 
coalition cabinet these key-words are replaced by 
terms like shared responsibility between parties, con- 
sumer choice and decentralization. Nevertheless, the 
main lines of ‘Plan-Simons’ (1990) are the same as 
‘Plan-Dekker’ (1987). 
The proposed system can be best characterized as 
a compulsory national health insurance (known as 
‘basic insurance’) based on regulated competition. 
Direct govemmem -ontrol over prices and pro- 
ductive capacities will have to make way for regulated 
competition among insurers and among health care 
providers. Price cartels and regional cartels that have 
originated as the result of anticompetitive govern- 
ment regulation and self-regulation, will be broken 
down. The benefits package of the basic insurance 
will be very comprehensive and will consist of nearly 
all non-catastrophic risks (hospital, physician, drugs, 
physiotherapy and some dental care), catastrophic 
risks (nursing home care, long-term institutional care 
for mentally and physically handicapped persons) 
and health care related social welfare (old people’s 
homes). Together these benefits account for about 
95% of total expenditures on health care and social 
welfare. In addition to the benefits not included in the 
basic benefits package (i.e. ‘supplemental’ care) the 
population has to pay 10% of the total expenditures 
via user charges. 
According to the government’s proposal, all indi- 
viduals will receive a subsidy to help them buy their 
compulsory health insurance from one of the compet- 
ing insurers.* The subsidy will come from a Central 
*Besides compulsory health insurance people are free to buy 
supplemental health insurance (e.g. for a single-bed 
room). The premium for this voluntary supplemental 
insurance will not be regulated or subsidized. 
Fund which will be filled with mandatory income-re- 
lated premiums, to be paid to the tax-collector. From 
the Central Fund the subsidy will go directly to the 
qualified insurer chosen by the insured. Qualified 
insurers are not allowed to refuse any insured in their 
working area and have to obey other procompetitive 
regulation. The maximum contract period is two 
years. So at least once every two years the consumer 
may choose another insurer. The subsidy per individ- 
ual is independent of the chosen insurer and will be 
equal to the expected per capita health care costs 
within the risk group which the insured belongs to, 
minus a fixed amount, which is equal for all individ- 
uals. The deficit created by this deducted fixed 
amount, is met by a flat rate premium to be paid by 
the insured directly to the insurer of his or her choice. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the proposed financ- 
ing system. 
An insurer is obliged to quote the same flat rate 
premium to all of his insureds who choose the same 
insurance contract. So the insurers’ revenues will 
consist of the risk-adjusted per capita payments from 
the Central Fund, supplemented by the flat rate 
premiums to be paid by the insureds. The difference 
between the actual costs and the risk-adjusted pay- 
ment will not be the same for all insurers and will be 
reflected in the Aat rate premium that the competing 
insurers will quote. This creates the incentive for 
insurers to be efficient. 
The insurers are expected to function as an inter- 
mediary between the consumer and the provider of 
care. To a high degree, insurers and providers will be 
free to negotiate the contractual terms. In the law the 
standardized benefits package of the basic insurance 
will not be described in terms of institutions like 
hospitals or nursing homes, but rather in terms of 
types of care. Any provider meeting certain quality 
standards is allowed to offer these services. This will 
greatly increase the possibilities for cost-effective 
substitution of care. Insurers will be allowed to 
selectively contract with providers and to offer differ- 
ent insurance contracts, as long as they provide 
coverage for all the types of care as described by law. 
The insurance contracts are different modalities of 
the standardized benefits package and may differ 
from each other only with respect to the list of the 
contracted providers of care and with respect to the 
conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to let the 
costs be covered by the insurer (for instance whether 
a referral card from a general practitioner is needed 
for the reimbursement of the cost of a specialist 
consultation). This flexibility in the description of the 
standardized benefits package should pave the way 
for setting up alternative health care delivery and 
insurance arrangements, such as health maintenance 
organizations and preferred provider organizations. 
Consumers will be free to choose among different 
insurers, picking the modality of the standardized 
benefits package they like the most. The premium 
paid will reflect the efficiency and cost-generating 
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behavior of the contracted health care providers. In following steps toward a market-oriented health care 
this way it is expected that a situation will arise in have been realized: 
which: 
-From 1993 sickness funds receive a partially 
-insureds are being rewarded for choosing risk -adjustedper capita payment from the Cen- 
efficient insurers and choosing cost-effective tral Fund. In addition, each insured has to pay 
providers of care; a flat rate premium to his sickness fund. Each 
-providers are being rewarded for effective and sickness fund is free to determine its own flat 
efficient provision of care; rate premium. So the main lines of the pro- 
-insurers, acting as intermediaries between in- posed financing system (see Fig. 1) have been 
sured consumers and contracted providers, are introduced in the sickness fund sector (62% of 
stimulated to contract efficient providers and the population). This implies a radical change. 
to do market research for finding out about During the period 1941-1991 all sickness 
the consumers’ preferences. funds received a full reimbursement of all their 
2.3. What has (not) been realized? 
medical expenditures. Therefore sickness 
funds are now in a transition from administra- 
According to the 1988-proposal the reform should tive pay-offices to risk-bearing enterprises. 
be realized by the end of 1992. The 1990-proposal -From 1994 sickness funds have the option to 
extended the implementation period with three years. selectively contract with physicians and phar- 
By mid 1994 however, it is clear that this time-sched- macists. This too implies a radical change. 
ule is far too optimistic. When we look at the two From 1941 sickness funds had the legal obli- 
key-elements of the proposed reform, i.e. basic in- gation to contract with each provider in their 
surance and regulated competition, we may conclude working area who wanted a contract. 
that in 1994 both of them are not realized and that -From 1992 sickness funds and private health 
the perspectives for a full realization of the proposals insurers are allowed to negotiate lower fees 
are minimal. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s the than the officially approved fees. During the 
Health insurers: 
Basic benefits 
Health care providers: 
Basic benefits 
\ \ \ \ \ . \ 
Supplemental benefits 
Legend: 
- = income-related payments 
--_-• = flat rate payments 
. . ...* I risk-adjustad payments 
Fig. 1. Proposed health care financing scheme in the Netherlands. [According to the current (1993) 
proposals the basic benefits package should comprise 95% of total health care expenditures (i.e. 
A + B + C + D = 95%). Two other restrictions are that 82% of the total health care expenditures hould 
be covered by income-related payments (A + C = 82%) and that (at least) 15% of the total health care 
expenditures hould be paid directly to the provider of care (C + D + E = 15%). Because the current 
income-related irect payments (primarily for institutional ong-term care) are assumed to remain 6% of 
total health care costs (C = 6%). the size of the payments as a percentage of total health care costs are 
as given in the figure.] Source: Ministry of Health, Letter to Parliament, 5 June 1992, Tweede Kamer 
1991-1992.22393 (20) (Note ‘Modemisering zorgsector: Weloverwogen verder’), SDU. The Hague, 1992. 
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period 1982-1992 it was an economic offence 
to charge higher or lower fees than officially 
approved. 
-From 1992 sickness funds are permitted to 
extend their regional working area and to gain 
members in other parts of the country. During 
the last decades it was practically impossible 
to do so because the required permission was 
usually not given. Now almost all sickness 
funds are working nation-wide. 
-From 1992 several private health insurance 
companies got permission to establish a new 
sickness fund organization. This implies an 
open entry to the sickness fund market. During 
the period 1941-199 1 no new sickness fund 
had been established (except by mergers of 
existing sickness funds). 
-From 1992 sickness fund members have the 
option (at least) once every two years to 
choose another sickness fund. Each sickness 
fund has to accept each applicant who is 
eligible for the sickness fund insurance. This 
means (potential) competition among sickness 
funds based on the flat rate premium, quality, 
the contracted providers, service, responsive- 
ness and reputation. 
-From 1992 general practitioners (GPs) are free 
to open a practice wherever they want. Until 
1992 GPs needed a license from the municipal- 
ity to settle down into practice. The decision 
whether or not a new licence was available, 
was dependent on the number of GP’s per 
capita in ti municipality. If a new license was 
available, a profile was made with the desired 
characteristics of the new GP and candidates 
could apply for the position in an open pro- 
cedure. 
Looking at the above changes in legislation we may 
conclude that they are important steps towards a 
market-oriented health care and that these steps can 
be expected to fundamentally change the functioning 
and organization of the Dutch health care. In our 
opinion the point-of-no-return towards regulated 
competition on both the insurance and the provider 
market for non-catastrophic risks has been passed, 
especially because the above changes have been sup- 
ported by both a center-left and a center-right co- 
alition cabinet. As far as these types of care are 
concerned, there seems to be no way back to the old 
regulatory regime. 
2.4. What effects? 
For several reasons it is much too early for a full 
evaluation of the reforms so far. Firstly, major effects 
of the above mentioned changes in legislation cannot 
be expected at short notice. Health care is like an oil 
tanker in full speed, that cannot be turned immedi- 
ately. Secondly, sickness fund organizations, which 
play a key role in the reform process, have a 50-year 
history as regional administrative pay-offices and 
cannot be expected to become entrepreneurial, risk- 
bearing and consumer-oriented organizations just 
overnight. Their first reactions to the procompetitive 
measures were to engage in defensive mergers and to 
form (or better: to continue) all kinds of territorial 
and price cartels to eliminate or mitigate competition. 
Not surprisingly, in the first open enrollment period 
(which was in 1992) only a few insureds switched 
from one sickness fund to another. However, since 
the entry to the sickness fund market is open for 
(competing) private health insurers, the cartel behav- 
ior of sickness funds is substantially reduced. There- 
fore, in the future modest competition among 
sickness funds can be expected. Thirdly, because of 
the imperfection of the risk-adjusted capitation pay- 
ments (see section 3.1) sickness funds are made 
responsible for only 3% of the differences between 
their actual expenditures in 1993 and the normative 
expenditure level on which the risk-adjusted capita- 
tion payments are based. The remaining 97% of their 
expenses is still retrospectively reimbursed. It is gov- 
ernment’s intention to enlarge the risk bearing per- 
centage for the sickness funds together with 
improvements in the payment formula. Fourthly, 
despite the above mentioned changes, a substantial 
part of the old regulatory regime is still in force, e.g. 
with respect o hospital budgeting and hospital plan- 
ning. This largely hinders the full development of 
innovative initiatives. 
Although it is too early for a complete evaluation, 
the following effects of the reforms are worth men- 
tioning: 
-As the result of only the discussion about a 
more market-oriented health care system, we 
see a huge increase during the early 1990s in 
the activities concerning quality improvement 
and quality assurance. Several national con- 
ferences on the quality of care were organized 
with official representatives of the physicians, 
the hospitals, the insurers and the consumers. 
The association of GPs has developed some 50 
protocols for frequently occurring medical 
complaints. The specialists are organizing 
quality assurance site visits in hospitals. The 
dentists are developing protocols. All associ- 
ations of medical professions are discussing or 
developing a system of re-registration (say 
each 5 years) or certification. In the last three 
years we have seen more activities concerning 
quality assurance and quality improvement 
than in the 20 years before. Probably the main 
driving force for all these quality-improving 
activities is the idea that quality of care will be 
the major issue in a competitive health care 
system. Insurers who (selectively) contract 
providers of care, will be primarily interested, 
next to price, in good quality and good ser- 
vices, because their insureds are interested in 
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that. Providers of care might also fear that if 
they themselves do not develop criteria for 
good quality, insurers will do it. 
---In the early 1990s we see increasing invest- 
ments in cost-accounting systems by hospitals 
and other health care institutions. Most insti- 
tutions are in a process of gradual transition 
from input- to output-pricing. At present, 
most prices in health care are administrative 
prices with no relation to the real costs of the 
services provided. These administrative prices 
provide misleading signals to all parties. 
Knowledge about the nature and real costs of 
the different services is necessary in a more 
competitive market. It prevents providers of 
care from selling products below costs (i.e. 
with losses) and it enables insurers to be 
prudent buyers of care and to make the appro- 
priate trade-off between products that are 
substitutes for each other. 
-Since the early 1990s we see a total reorganiza- 
tion of the internal structure of sickness funds. 
They are preparing themselves for their new 
role, i.e. being an intermediary between con- 
sumers and providers of care in a competitive 
environment. Administration-oriented chief- 
executives who go into (early) retirement are 
replaced by entrepreneurial, market-oriented 
managers. The service to their members is 
being improved, like better opening hours and 
mobile offices. In the previous decades, when 
sickness funds had their regional monopoly, 
there -‘as no need for these types of activities. 
-In anticipation of the proposed annulment of 
the difference between sickness fund insureds 
and privately insureds, we see an integration 
of sickness funds and private health insurers in 
the form of mergers, holdings and other forms 
of cooperation. Both parties have their own 
arguments to do so. Sickness funds hope to 
compensate their lack of experience with mar- 
keting, actuarial calculations and en- 
trepreneurship in a competitive environment. 
Furthermore sickness funds fear that private 
health insurers-their future competitors- 
have a competitive advantage because of their 
better image, because they sell group in- 
surance and because they combine health in- 
surance with other insurance products (like 
automobile, property and life insurance) and 
other financial services (‘one-counter shop- 
ping’). A major argument for private health 
insurers to integrate with sickness funds is to 
sell-via health insurance--other insurance 
products and financial services. Health in- 
surance is characterized by a high frequency of 
contacts between insurers and insureds, which 
provide ample opportunities to sell other 
products. Another important reason for inte- 
gration is the regionally concentrated mem- 
bership of sickness funds, which is crucial for 
obtaining sufficient bargaining power at a 
regional level. Finally, the integration with 
sickness funds offers private health insurers 
the opportunity to benefit from their greater 
experience in contracting with health care 
providers. Most industry observers expect hat 
as a result of these consolidations within a few 
years there will be left only 10 to 15 national 
chains of health insurers, serving a total popu- 
lation of about 15 million people. 
-In the early 1990s we see several innovative 
activities. For example, sickness funds have 
broken the price cartel of providers of some 
medical devices. Subsequently, prices went 
down by a quarter to a third. Insurers are 
developing mail order firms as an alternative 
distribution method of pharmaceuticals. All 
kinds of electronic data interchange (EDI) 
projects are being developed, aimed at a better 
cooperation among providers and a more 
efficient cooperation between providers and 
insurers. 
-Finally, we see an increasing number of activi- 
ties of consumer- and patient-organizations. 
General consumer-organizations are involved 
in projects to better inform the population e.g. 
about health insurance conditions and choice 
of sickness funds. Consumer guides increas- 
ingly publish articles about health care. Hun- 
dreds of patient-organizations have organized 
themselves in a national organization in order 
to become an effective interest group. 
2.5. Reasons for ‘slow progress 
Although the implementation of the reforms is far 
behind schedule, from a historic point of view radical 
changes have been realized within a relatively short 
period of time. Take, for example, the abolition of the 
contract obligation for sickness funds. During the 
first decades of this century there has been a long 
conflict between sickness funds and physicians about 
whether or not sickness funds should have the option 
to selectively contract with physicians. Ultimately the 
physicians won this conflict and from 1941 (until 
1991) sickness funds had the legal obligation to enter 
into a uniform contract with each physician estab- 
lished in their working area. Though creating the 
opportunity for selective contracting is another thing 
as putting it into practice, it certainly is a fundamen- 
tal change from a historic point of view. 
Those who are familiar with the history of the 
Dutch health care policy, probably have foreseen that 
the government’s time-schedule was far too opti- 
mistic. On the other hand, if government would have 
announced a more realistic time-schedule, say IO-15 
years, probably nothing would have been changed 
until now. As discussed before, the credible threat of 
competition has generated an enormous change in 
conduct of all parties involved. 
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What are the reasons for the ‘slow’ progress of the 
reforms? At least four reasons can be mentioned. 
Firstly, the resistance from interest groups who have 
powerful lobbies. Dutch health policy is characterized 
by a diffuse decision-making structure without a clear 
cut center of power. Hence, the government cannot 
impose changes without the consent of major interest 
groups, such as the organizations of physicians, 
health insurers, employers and employees [5]. The 
employers oppose Plan-Simons because they are 
afraid that a compulsory national health insurance 
with a broad benefits package would increase total 
health care costs (because of moral hazard). Because 
the premium is partly paid by the employers, in- 
creases in health expenditures would increase their 
labor costs and thereby deteriorate their international 
market position. The insurers oppose Plan-Simons 
because they strongly oppose a system of risk-ad- 
justed capitation payments from the Central Fund 
and other government regulation that reduces their 
entrepreneurial freedom. The physicians oppose Plan- 
Simons because they find the functional description 
of the benefits package too general, leaving too much 
room for competition among providers of care. 
A second reason for the slow progress of the 
reform is that the chosen implementation strategy has 
triggered growing political opposition. The Dutch 
government is traditionally composed of changing 
coalitions of at least two political parties. The term 
of government is four years at maximum, which is far 
too short to implement comprehensive health care 
reforms. As a consequence, viable reform proposals 
must be reasonab;. acceptable to all major political 
parties. From a political point of view the two key 
elements of the reforms are well-balanced. The basic 
insurance is attractive for the political left wing; 
regulated competition is attractive for the political 
right wing. This political balance of the reform 
proposal probably explains why both a center-right 
and a center-left coalition cabinet supported the 
reform proposal. Because of the complexity of the 
reforms, they have to be implemented step by step. 
But the step-by-step approach itself introduces a new 
complexity. In order to be politically acceptable, each 
step has to be as balanced as the whole reform 
proposal. According to the perception of the poli- 
ticians this was not the case. The political right wing, 
supported by the employers, strongly opposed some 
steps because in their opinion more emphasis was put 
on the implementation of the basic insurance than on 
cost containment efforts. Another political problem is 
that the introduction of a basic insurance is likely to 
generate negative income-redistribution effects for 
relatively young and healthy middle-class people with 
private health insurance. 
Thirdly, there is no urgent needfor a quick reform. 
In a sense the reorganization of the health care system 
*In this section we will consider the terms ‘insurer’ and 
‘third-party purchaser of health care’ as synonyms. 
is aimed at anticipating the ‘luxury’ problems of the 
next century: an advancing medical technology, an 
ageing population, and an expected increase of the 
share of gross national product going to health care. 
From a macro-economic point of view a step by step 
reform of the health care system can be afforded. 
Fourthly, the technical complexity of the reforms is 
very high and has seriously been underestimated. 
Several problems relate to the process of implemen- 
tation, such as the coordination of overlapping and 
sometimes inconsistent new and old regulations, the 
avoidance of substantial negative wealth effects for 
parts of the population, and the fine tuning with 
complex EC regulations. Another important problem 
concerns the content and the appropriate definition 
of the benefits that should be covered by the basic 
insurance. In addition, the problem of maintaining a 
workable competitive health care system should be 
addressed, which requires the development and en- 
forcing of an effective anti-cartel policy in health care 
[3]. Probably the two most vexing problems, however, 
are related to the proposed role of the insurer as a 
third-party purchaser of health care on behalf of the 
consumer. The first problem is how to prevent cream 
skimming (or preferred risk selection) in a competitive 
health insurance market where insurers receive a 
risk-adjusted capitation payment. The second prob- 
lem is concerned with the question how to ensure that 
the competing insurers will not skimp the quality of 
some types of (long-term) care. 
3. SKIMMING AND SKIMPING 
We will further concentrate on the two last men- 
tioned problems, which can shortly be referred to as: 
skimming and skimping. The reason to focus on these 
problems is that they are not, like most of the other 
problems, specific for the Dutch reforms. Skimming 
and skimping are universal problems that might 
occur in any competitive market for health insurance 
(or: third-party purchasing of health care)* with a 
regulated premium structure. 
3.1. Cream skimming 
An important aspect of government regulation in 
the reformed Dutch health care system is the determi- 
nation of the risk-adjusted capitation payments that 
the insurers receive from the Central Fund. The 
risk-adjusted payment per insured is dependent on 
the risk category to which the insured belongs. From 
1993 all sickness funds in the Netherlands receive 
such payments for most of the non-catastrophic risks 
(hospital care, physician, drugs, physiotherapy and 
some dental care). In 1993 the per capita payments 
depend on the risk-adjusters age and gender. How- 
ever, these risk categories appear to be much too 
heterogeneous. Sickness funds that have relatively 
(many) unhealthy insureds per age-gender group, 
receive too low payments. For example, the regional 
sickness fund in Amsterdam claims that in Amster- 
SSM 39110-E 
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dam there are-per age-gender group-relatively 
many AIDS-patients, drug addicts and people in the 
low socio-economic groups (‘big-city problems’). 
A major disadvantage of too heterogeneous risk 
categories is that cream skimming may be very 
advantageous to the insurers. By cream skimming (or 
preferred risk selection) we understand selection by 
the insurer of so-called preferred risks, i.e. those 
insureds for whom the insurer considers the risk-ad- 
justed per capita payment to be (far) above the 
expected cost level. If age and gender are the only 
risk-adjusters, cream skimming can be very 
profitable. From a previous study [6] we conclude 
that the 10% of the population with the highest 
non-catastrophic health expenditures (hospital, phys- 
icians, pharmaceuticals) in any year can be predicted 
to have per capita expenditures four years later that 
are on average nearly double the per capita expendi- 
tures within their age-gender group. So based on its 
own claims records each insurer can easily distinguish 
high-risk individuals.* 
The adverse effects of cream skimming are three- 
fold. Firstly, for the chronically ill access to good 
health care may be hindered. Insurers will try to 
attract preferred risks and deter non-preferred risks. 
If the capitation payment system does not adequately 
compensate for health status, insurers might prefer 
not to contract with providers of care who have a 
good reputation of treating patients with AIDS, 
cancer, diabetes or high blood pressure, for instance, 
because the insurers do not want the patients who are 
attracted by these providers to be their subscribers. 
Secondly, ii. the case of an insufficiently refined 
payment system eficient insurers may be driven out 
of the market by inesfcient insurers who are success- 
ful in cream skimming. Thirdly, whilst individual 
insurers can gain by cream skimming, they only shift 
the costs to others, so there is no social gain. In fact, 
because of the costs involved in the process of cream 
skimming, there are only social welfare losses. In 
sum, if cream skimming takes place, it is counterpro- 
ductive with respect to three supposedly positive 
effects of competition, i.e. improving the quality and 
efficiency of care and becoming more responsive to 
the consumers’ preferences. 
A lesson that can be learned from the Dutch 
reforms is that a system of sufficiently refined risk-ad- 
justed capitation payments is a necessary condition in 
order to let the reforms be successful. In 1993 the 
payments that sickness funds receive are only depen- 
dent on age and gender. In order to reduce the above 
mentioned disadvantages of an insufficiently refined 
payment system, the Dutch government introduced a 
system of risk-sharing between the sickness funds and 
the Central Fund. In 1993 an individual sickness fund 
*For an overview of strategies that can be pursued by 
insurers to perform cream skimming as well as for 
measures government can take to prevent cream skim- 
ming, see Ref. [7]. 
is responsible for only 3% of the difference between 
its actual expenses and the predicted expenses based 
on age and gender. However, as long as the remaining 
97% is retrospectively reimbursed, government does 
not want to give up the old tools for cost contain- 
ment. Sickness funds, in turn, reproach government 
for providing them with financial risks without giving 
them sufficient tools for cost containment. This vi- 
cious circle can only be broken by the introduction of 
a sufficiently refined payment system. Therefore, a 
workable system of sufficiently refined risk-adjusted 
capitation payments is a necessary condition in order 
to reap the fruits of a competitive health insurance 
market with a regulated premium structure. Based on 
research findings [7] we are optimistic about the 
technical possibilities of finding a sufficiently refined 
capitation payment formula for the non-catastrophic 
risks. However, the implementation of such a capita- 
tion payment system in practice requires a consider- 
able effort in data collection, research and 
administrative organization. In the first 5 years of the 
reforms the Dutch government has severely underes- 
timated these issues. 
We cannot draw any conclusion about the techni- 
cal (im)possibility of finding a sufficiently refined 
capitation payment formula for the catastrophic risks, 
like long-term nursing home care and long-term 
institutional care for mentally and physically handi- 
capped persons. Although age and gender, together 
with some straightforward indicators like ‘whether or 
not being mentally or physically handicapped’, will 
probably yield higher proportions of predicted vari- 
ance for individual catastrophic expenditures than for 
non-catastrophic expenditures, the maximum pre- 
dictable variance probably also is much higher for 
catastrophic than for non-catastrophic expenditures. 
As far as we know there has been no empirical study 
on risk-adjusted capitation payment formulas for 
catastrophic risks dealing with questions like: which 
risk-adjusters should be included? And what are the 
potential expected losses and profits for several sub- 
groups per set of risk-adjusters? In the Netherlands, 
until now, the relevant data are lacking for perform- 
ing even an explorative study in this area. 
3.2. Quality skimping 
A second major issue with respect o a competitive 
market for health insurance is the question whether 
or not competing insurers will be inclined to skimp 
the quality of some types of (long-term) care in order 
to reduce costs. By ‘quality skimping’ we mean rhe 
reduction of the quality of cure to u level which is below 
the minimum level that is acceptable to society. It is 
important to understand that not every reduction in 
quality is unacceptable to society. Take, for example, 
a certain disease for which an effective treatment A 
exists with a high, but reasonable price. Suppose 
there is also a treatment B which is a little bit more 
effective than A, but its price is the tenfold of the price 
of A. Then, in order to get the best value for money, 
Should catastrophic risks be included? 1467 
society could decide that everybody should have ac- 
cess to treatment A, but not to B. (For an example of 
such a choice, see Eddy [8].) So a marginal reduction 
of quality, in order to prevent a Cadillac-only style of 
care which society cannot afford, is not considered as 
‘quality skimping’. In fact, such a reduction improves 
society’s overall welfare. 
In this section we will discuss the ‘quality skimping’ 
problem under the assumption that there is a work- 
able system of risk-adjusted capitation payments uch 
that the cream skimming problem is sufficiently 
solved. Further we assume that, according to the 
Dutch reform proposal, competing insurers receive 
risk-adjusted payments for a broad benefits package 
including both non-catastrophic and catastrophic 
risks, that they are allowed to selectively contract with 
competing providers of care and that there is an 
effective competition (or: antitrust) policy to ensure 
workable competition on the insurance market as well 
as on the provider market [3]. 
There are several arguments to expect that the 
proposed type of a regulated competitive market for 
health insurance might increase the quality of care 
(both technical quality and service quality). Firstly, if 
the consumer is not satisfied, he or she will choose 
another insurance contract or another insurer. A 
single well documented case of an insurer contracting 
with a provider who delivers poor quality care, can 
severely damage his reputation followed by a dra- 
matic drop in membership. Insurers will have a great 
stake in developing and maintaining a good repu- 
tation. Therefore :+ is to be expected that insurers will 
primarily be interested in good quality when selecting 
and contracting providers. Of course, given a certain 
level of sufficient quality, they will be interested in the 
least costly alternative. 
Secondly, in a competitive market more infor- 
mation on the quality of care may become available 
than in a non-competitive market, and the availability 
of public information on quality will stimulate the 
providers of care to improve quality. Insurers will 
demand information on quality or they will collect it 
themselves in order to find out high quality providers. 
Consumer organizations will also provide the con- 
sumers with information enabling them to make the 
right choices. As we have seen in section 2.4, even the 
discussion about a competitive market may give rise 
to systems of quality assurance and certification. 
Consumers probably prefer certified providers, induc- 
ing insurers to conclude contracts with them. There- 
fore, providers of care who fail to get approval from 
the institute of certification will have difficulties ob- 
taining a contract with an insurer. In conjunction with 
*The Dutch government i tends to specify minimum require- 
ments with respect o the quality ofcare. Furthermore, as 
suggested byEnthoven [9], government should require the 
development of a national system of standard reporting of 
health outcomes and other indicators of quality. 
necessary government regulation*, this kind of mar- 
ket and self-regulation may improve quality of care. 
A third reason to expect that a competitive health 
insurance market might increase quality, is that good 
quality of care may reduce future medical expendi- 
tures. As Enthoven [lo] states: “The first and most 
important way to control cost while maintaining 
quality is to control quality. That is, to do it right the 
first time. The right diagnosis made promptly and the 
appropriate procedure done by a person who is profi- 
cient and experienced and good at it, produces both 
the best quality result and the most economical result. 
In medical care quality and economy usually go hand 
in hand”. Therefore, one of the insurers’ tools to 
contain costs is to stimulate the provision of good 
quality of care. 
In the proposed type of a regulated competitive 
health insurance market, pressure from the demand 
side urges insurers to act as an agent in the interest of 
the consumer. In general, insurers can expand their 
market share by being responsive to consumers’ pref- 
erences and by contracting with efficient providers 
who deliver good quality care. For types of care of 
which a large percentage of the population consider 
themselves as potential users, the pressure from the 
demand side is likely to be sufficient o guarantee good 
quality care. For example, although a small percent- 
age of the population is hospitalized during a year, 
most people realize that after a traffic accident they 
might get hospitalized, and therefore are interested in 
good quality hospital care. So an insurer who devel- 
ops the reputation of contracting inferior hospital 
care, will probably lose a substantial part of his 
market share. However, the question arises whether 
the above arguments are valid for all types ofcare. Are 
there types of (long-term) care for which the insurer 
could skimp the quality without losing noticeable 
market share? The following two categories of care 
can be discerned for which quality skimping may 
become a problem because of insufficient pressure 
from the demand side: 
1. Care that is often used by persons who do not 
have the (mental) ability to make a trade-off 
between price and quality; 
2. Care that most people are not interested in 
because they have a very low probability of 
needing it during the next contract period. 
The extent to which quality skimping may be a 
problem also depends on the extent to which an 
insurer is able to discriminate relevant ypes of care. If 
the relevant type of care is delivered by a ‘general’ 
provider who delivers many types of care (e.g. a 
general practitioner or a general hospital), it might be 
a hard job for an insurer to contract inferior quality 
for one or two types of care and good quality for ail 
the other types of care delivered by the same provider. 
Therefore, the problem of quality skimping may 
be particularly relevant in cases where specific 
types of care are delivered by specialized pro- 
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fessionals or institutions. In the following sections, we 
will examine the above two categories of care more 
closely. 
3.2.1. Inability to make choices. For types of (long- 
term) care that are often used by persons who do not 
have the (mental) ability to make a trade-off between 
price and quality, the above arguments concerning a 
well-informed consumer choosing an appropriate 
health plan-voting with his feet-might not be valid. 
Examples are care for the mentally defectives, care 
for demented people, and care received by people 
who are not able to express their preferences. Of 
course, not all consumers need to be well-informed 
and critical decision-makers in order to favorably 
influence insurers’ behavior (and thereby the 
providers’ behavior). If those who, for whatever 
reason, do not make a trade-off between price and 
quality, only constitute a minority of the users of that 
type of care, they might be ‘free riders’ and might 
benefit from the critical consumer behavior of others. 
However, the free rider argument may not apply, for 
example, to long-term institutional care for the men- 
tally handicapped. Skimping the quality of care for 
mentally defectives who receive long-term insti- 
tutional care can yield high financial rewards. A 
reduction of 5% of the cost for such a patient equals 
the average total health care expenditure for an 
average person. There are several aspects of quality 
that insurers could subtly influence via selectively 
contracting with providers, like the professional qual- 
ity of the physicians, the number and quality of the 
specialized nurses and other personnel, waiting lists, 
geographical ‘ccess (e.g. distance), the hotel func- 
tions (e.g. number of patients per room) and other 
services. 
In order to reduce the chance of skimping the 
quality of care that is often used by persons who do 
not have the (mental) ability to make a trade-off 
between price and quality, major decisions about 
health care could be made by an agent who is 
watchful of that person’s interest, for instance a 
family-member or a close-friend. For people who 
have no relatives or others who are prepared to serve 
as an agent, society could appoint professional agents 
(or agency organizations). For instance, specialized 
licensed case-managers could be appointed to take 
care of such a person’s health care matters, compar- 
able to the guardian who is responsible for looking 
after that person’s property. Furthermore, govern- 
ment could determine detailed requirements concern- 
ing the quality of care for these types of services. As 
an ultimum remedy government could take away the 
insurers’ financial incentive for quality skimping by 
providing full retrospective reimbursement of the cost 
of care. 
3.2.2. Large proportion of indifferent low -risk users. 
Quality skimping may also occur if a large proportion 
of the population behave as if they are indifferent 
about the quality of specific categories of care for 
which they have a very low probability of needing it 
during the next contract period. The indifferent atti- 
tude may be caused by the fact that ‘myopic’ individ- 
uals simply neglect the low ‘objective’ probability to 
need it, so that their ‘subjective’ probability is zero. 
Besides, their indifference may also be caused by the 
fact that the search costs of finding out quality 
differences are likely to exceed the expected benefits, 
because the expected benefits are presumably small 
due to the low probability of needing that type of 
care. The indifferent attitude of a substantial number 
of low-risk users towards the quality of specific types 
of care, may induce insurers to skimp the quality of 
that care without losing noticeable market share. 
The following simple example may elucidate this 
argument. Suppose that for a specific type of care X, 
the total number of potential users N can be divided 
into a small group of high-risk individuals (NH) 
whose probability of using X during the next contract 
period is unity (P,, = l), and a large group of low-risk 
individuals (NL), whose probability of using X during 
the next contract period is very low (0 < P, < 0.01). 
Next, assume that conditional on using X, all users 
have the same costs c. If E denotes the total expendi- 
tures on X, then the total expenditures of the high- 
risk and low-risk utilizers can be defined as 
EH = c . NH and EL = c . P, NL respectively. Sup- 
pose low-risk individuals behave as if their prob- 
ability of using X is zero, so that only the high-risk 
individuals are interested in the quality of X. Thus the 
only pressure from the demand side to contract and 
deliver good quality care X comes from NH. Then 
insurers will not lose noticeable market share if they 
use the compensation they receive for the expected 
costs of the low-risk individuals (EL), for investments 
in other types of care or for reducing the premium. 
Hence, there is an incentive for insurers to skimp the 
quality of X. 
Whether or not quality skimping will be a serious 
problem, however, crucially depends on the fraction 
of all expenditures on X that is intended to be spent 
on the low-risk group: EL/E. The problem of quality 
skimping increases as this fraction increases. This 
conclusion can be illustrated by the following numeri- 
cal example. Assume that 0.2% of the population has 
probability one to use a certain expensive type of care 
X during the next contract period, and let us begin by 
assuming that the other 99.8% of the population has 
an objective probability of zero (PL = 0). With respect 
to X one cannot speak anymore of ‘insurance’, 
because there is no uncertainty anymore. Further- 
more the risk-adjusted capitation payments to the 
insurers for the 0.2% ‘certain’ users can be considered 
as a kind of ‘ciient-tied budget’. The insurers there- 
fore are supposed to function more as a ‘specialized 
case-manager’ or a ‘prudent buyer of care’ than as an 
insurer. One might expect that a few ‘insurers’ will 
specialize in this submarket and that the patient- 
organizations or organizations of parents or other 
agents of the patients are in very close relation with 
these specialized ‘insurers’. This might stimulate the 
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Total population: N, + IV, = 1,ooO.ooO 
Probability of 
low-risk 
individuals (P, ) 
Number of low-risk individuals: N, = 998.000 
Number of high-risk individuals: N, = 2OMl 
Expected number Expected number Expected total 
of low-risk users of high-risk users number of users 
(P, ,NI) (PH NH = NH ) (PI .NI +NH) 
Low-risk 
users as a 
fraction of all 
users (4 /E)* 
0 0 2000 2000 0 
0.00001 9.98 2000 2009.98 0.005 
0.0001 99.8 2000 2099.8 0.05 
0.00 I 998 2000 2998 0.33 
0.01 9980 2000 II980 0.83 
*Notice that E,/E = (PL. N,)/(P, N, + NH) because all users are assumed to have the same costs (c) 
provision of good quality care. The fact that 99.8% 
of the population might not have any interest in good 
quality of X is not a problem because the insurers do 
not receive any payment for them to be spent on X 
(EL is zero because P, is zero). 
However, a problem may arise if the 99.8% of the 
population consider themselves to be ‘certain’ non- 
users (i.e. their subjective probability is zero) and 
therefore have no interest in (insurance contracts 
providing access to) good quality of X, but their 
objective probability to use X in the next contract 
period is positive (P, > 0). In this situation, insurers 
receive a compensation for the expected expenditures 
on X of the 99.8% of low-risk users (EL), who are not 
interested in (insurance contracts providing access to) 
good quality of X because their subjective probability 
is zero. The chance that insurers will skimp the 
quality of X depends on the fraction of the total 
amount of money intended to be spent on this type 
of care, that is gt. .n to the insurers as a part of the 
risk-adjusted payments for the majority of the popu- 
lation (EL/E). If this fraction is small, then the 
‘certain’ users form a majority of the users of this type 
of care and therefore-assuming that the ‘certain’ 
users force the insurers to contract providers that 
deliver good quality-the chance on quality skimping 
will be small. In fact, the low-risk users than behave 
as free-riders. However, if the fraction is large, insur- 
ers’ behavior might be more influenced by the in- 
different low-risk majority than by the high-interest 
minority of ‘certain’ users. From Table 1 we conclude 
that if the objective probability (Pr) for the majority 
of the population is equal to 0.00001, the fraction of 
the total amount to be spent on this type of care that 
will be allocated to them is 0.005 (again, assuming 
that the costs per user are the same for all users), 
which is negligibly small. However, when the objec- 
tive probability equals 0.001 (resp. 0.01) the fraction 
of the amount that goes to them increases to 0.33 
(resp. 0.83). Table 2 provides a numerical example of 
how, for a given objective probability for the low-risk 
individuals (PI. = O.OOOl), the fraction of the amount 
that goes to them increases as the percentage high- 
risk users in the population (100 . Na/N) decreases. 
If the percentage of high-risk users is 2% the impact 
of low-risk users on insurer behavior will be negli- 
gible, since EL/E is only 0.005. However, for very 
small values of NH the fraction EL/E approaches 
unity, in which case the lack of demand pressure from 
the low-risk users may become a problem. 
The problem of quality skimping does not only 
depend on the relative weight of the expenditures of 
the low-risk group (EL/E), but also on the absolute 
magnitude of EL. If the absolute level of EL is low, 
the financial rewards of quality skimping are small 
too. Therefore, the chance that an insurer will take 
the risk of incurring a bad reputation by skimping the 
quality will be lower, the lower EL. We conclude that 
incentives for quality skimping are greater the higher 
EL/E and the higher EL, keeping all other things 
equal. Given that EL/E equals P, . NL/(PL. NL + NH) 
and that EL equals c . PL . NL, this implies that the 
problem of quality skimping is greater, the higher PL 
(influencing both EL/E and EL), the higher c and the 
lower NH. 
Examples of types of care for which insurers may 
have an incentive to skimp the quality are long-term 
institutional care for physically handicapped people, 
Table 2. The number of low-risk users as a fraction of all users, for different percentages of high-risk users in the 
population (given that P, = 0.0001 and P, = I) 
Total population N = N, + N, = I ,OCQ,OOO 
Percentage of Low-risk 
high risk users in Expected number Expected number Expected total users as a 
the population of low-risk users of high-risk users number of users fraction of all 
W@.N,lN) V,. N,) (P,- NH = NH) (PL.NL+NH) users (EL/E). 
2 98 20.000 20,098 0.005 
0.2 99.8 zoo0 2099.8 0.05 
0.02 99.98 200 299.98 0.33 
0.002 99.998 20 119.998 0.83 
0 100 0 100 1.0 
*Notice that EL/E = (PL. N,)/(P, N, + NH) because all users are assumed to have the same costs (c). 
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institutional care for mental defectives, institutional 
care for chronic psychiatric patients, long-term care 
for alcohol and drug addicts and long-term nursing 
home care. These expensive benefits are characterized 
by a dichotomous probability density function: a 
large proportion of the population with a very low 
probability of using those benefits during the next 
contract period, and a small proportion of the popu- 
lation consisting of almost certain users. Further- 
more, these types of care are delivered by providers 
who are specialized in this type of care. In these cases, 
where there is a very small fraction of the population 
who are certain users of very expensive care, where a 
substantial part of the population is a potential user 
(P,_ > 0) and the overwhelming majority of the poten- 
tial users consider themselves to be certain non-users, 
one may wonder whether there is sufficient pressure 
from the demand side to influence the insurers in such 
a way that they will not skimp the quality of these 
types of care. Empirical data are lacking to draw 
specific conclusions for different types of care. 
There are several ways government could intervene 
to reduce the problem of quality skimping. Firstly, 
government and consumer organizations could re- 
duce search costs and consumer myopia by providing 
information about the relevance of specific types of 
care and about the objective probability of needing it. 
Secondly, government could certify insurance con- 
tracts and could require that any insurance contract 
provides coverage for at least certain (specified) qual- 
ity of care. Finally, government could take away the 
insurers’ financial incentives for quality skimping by 
providing full -strospective reimbursement of the cost 
of care. 
3.2.3. Different regulatory regimes. Although the 
last mentioned tool is very effective in preventing 
quality skimping, it also takes away the insurers 
financial incentives for an efficient provision and 
cost-effective substitution of these types of care. This 
implies a totally different regulatory regime for these 
types of services compared with the ‘regulated com- 
petition’-model as proposed by the Dutch govern- 
ment. Therefore, if government decides to reimburse 
the insurers for the total costs of certain types of care, 
new questions come up like: 
-who should be responsible for efficiency with 
respect o these types of care? 
-should there be competition among the 
providers of these types of care? 
-where exactly should we draw the boundary 
between types of care for which the insurers 
bear and do not bear financial responsibility? 
-and how can we prevent that insurers encour- 
age substitution of expensive care for which 
they do not bear any financial responsibility, 
for less expensive care for which they do bear 
financial responsibility (or that they block 
substitution the other way around)? 
4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSlON 
In this paper we have presented an overview of 5 
years of market-oriented reforms of the Dutch health 
care system. Although major changes have already 
taken place, the implementation process will take 
much longer than the 5 years as planned by govern- 
ment, because of resistance from interest groups and 
the technical and political complexity of the reforms. 
Most technical and political problems are specific for 
the Dutch health care system. Two major technical 
problems, however, seem to be relevant for all 
countries considering a regulated competitive market 
for third-party purchasing of health care. These 
problems can be labeled as cream skimming and 
quality skimping. In drawing conclusions with re- 
spect to these problems it appears to be essential to 
make a distinction between catastrophic risks and 
non-catastrophic risks. 
Crucial to the solution of cream skimming is the 
development of a system of sufficiently refined risk- 
adjusted capitation payments to health insurers. 
Based on evidence from empirical research we are 
optimistic about the feasibility of a sufficiently refined 
capitation payment formula for the non-catastrophic 
risks (like hospital care, physician services and drugs). 
However, the practical implementation of such a 
payment system requires a considerable ffort in data 
collection, research and administrative organization. 
Because empirical evidence is lacking, we are less 
confident about the feasibility of an adequate capita- 
tion payment formula for catastrophic risks (like 
several forms of expensive long-term care). At present 
in the Netherlands the necessary data about 
catastrophic risks for the construction of an adequate 
formula are virtually nonexistent. Hence, there is no 
prospect, at least within the next five years, for a 
workable system of risk-adjusted capitation pay- 
ments for catastrophic risks. 
Those who are not convinced of the potential 
solutions of the cream skimming problem, may favor 
the combination of a monopsonistic market for 
health insurance and a competitive provider market. 
However, one should realize that the prevention of 
cream-skimming is not only relevant for a competi- 
tive health insurance market, but also for a competi- 
tive provider market, where competing groups of 
providers receive an ex-ante determined capitation 
payment to provide (or to purchase) a defined set of 
services to a defined population group, like for 
instance the GP-fundholders in the U.K. [II]. 
Whether cream skimming will be more or less of a 
problem in a regulated competitive insurance market 
than in a competitive provider market, remains an 
open question. On the one hand, providers have more 
opportunities for cream skimming than insurers be- 
cause they probably have better information about 
the riskiness of their patients and because they can 
use more subtle tools (‘My colleague around the 
corner is very specialized in treating your disease’). 
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On the other hand, providers may be more reluctant 
to skim the cream than insurers because of more 
powerful ethical restraints to do so. Therefore, an- 
swering the question how to prevent cream skimming 
in a regulated competitive health care market really 
provides a challenge to all countries that intend or 
implement market-oriented reforms in health care. 
A second major problem that is relevant for all 
countries considering market-oriented reforms, is to 
find a way to counteract incentives for skimping the 
quality of specific types of care. By ‘quality skimping’ 
we mean the reduction of the quality of care to a level 
which is below the minimum level that is acceptable 
to society. We have mentioned several arguments 
why we expect that a regulated competitive market 
for health insurance may increase the quality of care, 
especially for the non-catastrophic risks. Insurers 
have great interest in developing and maintaining a 
good reputation, consumers may vote with their feet, 
the demand for information will rise and will prob- 
ably result in the establishment of certification insti- 
tutes and systems of accreditation. Given the extent 
of informational asymmetry and the complexity of 
information about the different aspects of quality of 
care, government still has to play an important role. 
To safeguard a minimum level of quality, government 
should specify minimum requirements with respect o 
the quality of care. In addition, government should 
require the development of a national system of 
standard reporting of health outcomes and other 
indicators of quality, to create the opportunity to 
compare standardized information about the quality 
of care. However. we have argued that the above 
arguments may not hold for two categories of care: 
(1) care that is regularly used by persons who do not 
have the (mental) ability to make a trade-off between 
price and quality; and (2) care of which many people 
are indifferent about its quality because they ignore 
the low but positive probability of needing it during 
the next contract period. Examples of these types of 
care are: institutional care for mental defectives, 
long-term institutional care for physically handi- 
capped people, chronic psychiatric care, long-term 
care for alcohol and drug addicts and long term 
nursing home care. Most of these types of care can 
be labeled as catastrophic risks. 
The preceding analysis provides strong arguments 
for having different regulatory regimes for non- 
catastrophic and some of the catastrophic risks, at 
least during the implementation process of health 
care reforms like those in the Netherlands. Firstly, the 
prospect for a workable system of risk-adjusted pay- 
ments for the catastrophic risks is highly uncertain. 
Without a workable payment system, cream skim- 
ming is very profitable with respect o these types of 
care. As a result of cream skimming the access to 
good health for the chronically ill may be hindered. 
Furthermore, efficient insurers might be driven out of 
the market by inefficient insurers who are successful 
in cream skimming. Secondly, even if a workable 
system of risk-adjusted payments for catastrophic 
risks can be developed, the problem of quality skimp- 
ing is much more severe for catastrophic risks than 
for non-catastrophic risks. 
Consequently, countries that are considering a 
competitive market for third-party purchasing of 
health care, should primarily focus their efforts on the 
market for non-catastrophic risks, like hospital care, 
physician services and pharmaceuticals. If in due time 
sufficient favorable experience with non-catastrophic 
risks will be accumulated, a gradual extension of the 
benefits package with some catastrophic risks could 
be considered. In 1988 the Dutch government pro- 
posed the introduction of a competitive health in- 
surance market for both non-catastrophic and 
catastrophic risks. After 5 years of health care re- 
forms in the Netherlands, there is a growing support 
to confine the implementation of the reforms to the 
non-catastrophic risks and to retain the old regulat- 
ory regime for the catastrophic risks (AWBZ). The 
price of this more cautious approach would be the 
continuation of the different ways of financing of 
non-catastrophic and catastrophic risks. Conse- 
quently, there will be no financial incentive for a 
cost-effective substitution of the two types of care. In 
drawing (and redrawing) the exact boundaries be- 
tween the two regulatory regimes, the expected ben- 
efits of cost-effective substitution should therefore be 
weighted against the potential harm caused by cream 
skimming and quality skimping. 
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